Countering the Power of Vested Interests: Advancing Rationality in Public Decision-Making by Stiglitz, Joseph E.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=mjei20
Download by: [Columbia University Libraries] Date: 22 September 2017, At: 12:34
Journal of Economic Issues
ISSN: 0021-3624 (Print) 1946-326X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/mjei20
Countering the Power of Vested Interests:
Advancing Rationality in Public Decision-Making
Joseph E. Stiglitz
To cite this article: Joseph E. Stiglitz (2017) Countering the Power of Vested Interests:
Advancing Rationality in Public Decision-Making, Journal of Economic Issues, 51:2, 359-365, DOI:
10.1080/00213624.2017.1320907
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00213624.2017.1320907
Published online: 19 May 2017.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 48
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
 Joseph E. Stiglitz is a professor at Columbia University. This article was prepared for presentation at the ASSA 
Meetings in Chicago on January 7, 2017. The author gratefully acknowledges the research support of the Institute for 
New Economic Thinking. He also wishes to acknowledge Paul Bouscasse, Matthieu Teachout, and Debarati Ghosh for 




©2017, Journal of Economic Issues / Association for Evolutionary Economics  
  JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES 
  Vol. LI    No. 2    June 2017 
  DOI 10.1080/00213624.2017.1320907 
Countering the Power of Vested Interests:  
Advancing Rationality in Public Decision-Making 
 
Joseph E. Stiglitz 
 
Abstract: Seemingly Pareto-improving reforms face more opposition than they 
should. In earlier work, I presented an explanation: voters correctly saw reforms as 
part of a long-term dynamic game, and they correctly saw how the reform affected 
outcomes (e.g., by affecting beliefs or coalition formation). Recent advances in 
behavioral economics derived from insights from sociology emphasize preference 
endogeneity, noting that beliefs are affected by those of others with whom one 
identifies and need not be consistent with rationality, as conventionally defined. 
Thus, individuals may have beliefs about the economic system that differ from 
those of economists. People may support policies which economists’ analyses 
suggest are contrary to their interests because they believe these policies advance 
their interests. Based on previous analyses of the causes of these seeming 
perversities, I show how economists can modify policy proposals in ways that 
enhance likelihood of support, e.g., with contingent provisions which are operative 
in the states of the world that economists know (believe) are unlikely to occur, but 
which enhance the wellbeing of individuals with such beliefs in those states. Those 
selling products that are adverse to one’s health have learned how to persuade 
customers to buy them. Likewise, politicians who are selling policies that are 
adverse to society’s wellbeing have learned how to market their ideas. Economists 
will similarly have to learn how to persuade citizens of the desirability of the 
evidence- and theory-based policies that they advocate. 
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After serving as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, I wrote an article 

































Joseph E. Stiglitz 
were Pareto improvements — or near enough to being Pareto improvements — which 
in a democracy should have received overwhelming support.1 At the Council, we had 
struggled to devise such Pareto or near-Pareto improvements, only to be disappointed 
by the outcomes of the political process. 
I speculated that this turn of events was related to the fact that participants in 
the political process saw it as a long-term, dynamic game, and any changes today had 
to be seen in terms of their impact on how that game played out. Thus, even if a 
reform seemed to make everyone better off today (without direct adverse long-run 
effects — in many cases, the long-run effects were even more positive), it might have 
adverse effects on certain interests in the longer run, particularly because of the way 
the political game would play out. It might, for instance, change the information 
available to different participants, and that in turn could have large effects. For 
example, the fact that hydroelectric power is sold to those in the state of Washington 
at very low prices is known and understood to be a hidden subsidy. But if unused 
hydroelectric potential were privatized and the electricity thereby generated sold at a 
market price to those elsewhere — benefitting the Treasury, reducing carbon 
emissions, and potentially lowering prices relative to what some of those without 
access to cheap hydroelectric power have to pay — it would make more transparent the 
magnitude of the hidden subsidy. Anyone receiving the subsidy might worry that this 
seemingly Pareto improvement would lead these subsidies to be eliminated in the 
long run, at which point the reform would be far from a Pareto improvement. 
Moreover, the political process surrounding the passage and/or implementation 
of reform legislation might lead to the formation of new coalitions.2 Coalition 
formation is often difficult, with high fixed costs, as history has shown. And history 
matters. The consequence of these new coalitions is hard to predict, but clearly the 
net effect on some groups could be adverse. 
Since my time on the Council, I have come to think that there is another and 
perhaps more important set of reasons: in some sense, also related to hard-to-foresee 
dynamics, but this time related more deeply to the functioning of the economy and 
society itself rather than to the political process. In spite of the advance of economic 
science, there are marked differences in beliefs about how the economy functions 
and, even more fundamentally, about the nature of man. Economics begins with a 
widely accepted set of premises within the profession: individuals have a fixed set of 
preferences, unalterable and, therefore, unaltered by policy (and, more generally, by 
experience). Thus, there is no worry that policies could have an impact on individuals 
or the nature of society. There is only a worry about incentives: namely, that too high 
a tax rate might reduce incentives for working, not that a policy might make 
individuals lazy or dependent. So, too, individuals are individualistic, thinking only 
about their own wellbeing. There is no concern about how policies might affect 
individuals’ sense of community, and words like “solidarity” and “community” play 
no role. 
1 See Joseph E. Stiglitz (1998). 
2 Of course, if the reforms were perceived as Pareto-improving, there would be no need for 
coalitions. But if some groups believe that, because of the long-run dynamics just described, these reforms 



































Yet, many voters have quite different views — views that are more consonant 
with recent advances in economics, attempting to incorporate insights from other 
social sciences than with traditional economics, but which undermine traditional 
welfare analyses, and necessitate asking deeper questions about what one means by a 
good society and the effect of alternative policies in achieving that.3 Economists, 
steeped in social-choice theories, similarly think of the political rules of the game that 
determine the outcome of the political process. By contrast, there is a proclivity to 
anthropomorphize the political system among the broader citizenry. Governments are 
lazy, or shirkers, or irresponsible. Like a stern parent, one has to teach governments to 
behave well by disciplining them when they are bad. 
Making matters worse is that economists themselves disagree about so much, 
thus making it easier for others to take the view that everything is a matter of opinion. 
With everything being a matter of personal opinion, what might seem to me (and to 
most economists that I respect) as almost surely a Pareto improvement, might be quite 
a different thing for others. This is even more so for changes that are “near-Pareto 
improvements,” for the few losers have every incentive to try to persuade citizens that 
others — including the majority — would also be among the losers. Thus, for example, 
a tax on land speculation would not lead to a decrease in the supply of land, and it 
might cause more investment in productive assets and human capital to be allocated 
to more productive uses. But land speculators have an incentive to conflate such a tax 
with a tax on entrepreneurship, and to suggest that such a tax would be “unfair” to 
the speculators and counterproductive to the economy. 
The question is: Why do economists see the world through such different 
lenses? There has been considerable evidence that economists suffer from 
confirmatory bias no less than ordinary mortals do. They are more likely to find (or at 
least publish) results that are consistent with their priors.4 Ascertaining causality is 
always difficult. In some cases, economists’ research findings may have affected their 
political beliefs, but in others, the causality runs the other way. 
Theorems are just that — theorems. But the question is: What is to be made of 
the theorems? How much attention do we pay to the caveats, the limitations of the 
assumptions? When Bruce Greenwald and I showed that whenever information is 
asymmetric or insurance markets are not complete, competitive markets are not 
constrained Pareto-efficient5 — that is, there always existed some government 
intervention(s) which could make everyone better off — I was amused at the flurry of 
work by conservative economists who attempted to show that our analysis was wrong 
or that the results were not robust. Almost four decades later, the results appear to be 
very robust, and have been established in a variety of contexts with a number of 
alternative proofs.6 Conservatives then respond by suggesting that the departures from 
efficiency are small — without presenting proof, or even some methodology through 
3 For a review, incorporating particularly notions of endogenous preferences, see Karla Hoff and 
Joseph E. Stiglitz (2016). 
4 See, for example, Zubin Jelveh, Bruce Kogut, and Suresh Naidu (2014). 
5 Bruce Greenwald and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1986). 

































Joseph E. Stiglitz 
which one could ascertain that. Indeed, one of the other important results in 
information economics is that even small amounts of information imperfections and 
asymmetries can have tremendous effects.7 
These differences in views about the functioning of the economy, human 
nature, and polities play out in many of the most important policy discussions, and 
help account for the persistence of ideas and policies that are so clearly 
counterproductive. They even help partially account for another, related puzzle: Why 
do individuals in their political lives so often support policies that seem counter to 
their interests? They typically believe that these policies are consonant with their 
interests. In democratic societies, vested interests often win through persuasion of the 
electorate. In some instances, ordinary individuals have been persuaded to identify 
with the rich. For example, citizens may oppose the estate tax because they believe 
that they are likely to strike it rich (far more likely than any statistics would suggest), 
and they then empathize with their (potential) new rich selves in desiring not to pay 
the estate tax. But, more often, they believe that these policies would be good for 
them as they are. Many have come to believe in trickle-down economics in all of its 
variants, such as, for example, that taxing the rich — seen as the job creators — would 
result in fewer jobs being created, thus lowering wages and employment. 
We should hardly be surprised, as modern corporations have learned how to sell 
dangerous products — including products that kill (like cigarettes). They have similarly 
learned how to shape opinions about tobacco and climate change. If one can sell 
dangerous products and cast aspersions on ideas that have overwhelming scientific 
support, clearly, one can sell ideas like trickle-down and supply-side economics. One 
can persuade individuals that what is not in their interests is, and vice versa.8 
At times, evolutionary economists might take comfort in the notion that, in the 
long run, things will work out for the best. The actions that are most conducive to a 
well-functioning society will eventually win out through a process of natural selection. 
But even if the process worked in the long run, the costs to those living in the interim 
may be high. Evolutionary processes are imperfect, at best, as we saw in the run-up to 
the Great Recession: those firms and managers that wanted to take more prudent 




It is important to understand the reasons for the failure to advance policies that are in 
the general interest and to know how to respond. Consider, for instance, the first set 
of reasons for the failure of seemingly Pareto improvements to be adopted: that the 
political dynamics are such that what might appear to be a Pareto improvement in fact 
7 See, for example, Peter A. Diamond (1971) and Michael Rothschild and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1976). 
8 See Joseph E. Stiglitz (2012, chs. 5 and 6). 
9 See Joseph E. Stiglitz (2010). 
10 More generally, evolutionary processes do not necessarily take adequate account of the value of 
adaptability. Imperfections of capital markets mean that strategies which might have a long-run value do not 



































is not when considered from a long-term perspective. One way to respond — but not 
without its costs — is by devising better commitment mechanisms. While, in 
democratic societies, one government cannot fully commit later governments, there 
are ways to increase the costs of potential reversals. The cost is that these policies may 
make it more difficult to undo the damage from “bad” policies.11 
If the reason is that there are differences in views about the world, sometimes 
the clever design of policy can provide an ex ante expected utility gain for both. 
Consider, for instance, the debate about using cap-and-trade to limit carbon emissions 
as a way of addressing climate change. Some in the private sector worry that the price 
of carbon would rise excessively. Environmentalists dismiss the concern as alarmist. A 
simple modification to the standard proposal may allay both concerns: a safety valve 
that allows for the issuance of more permits should the price exceed a certain level. 
Environmentalists, who really believe that the price would never get that high, should 
be willing to agree that there is a near-zero probability (in their minds) of such a 
contingency and the private sector would then know for sure that the price cannot 
exceed a certain threshold.12 
Sometimes, advocates of change should take advantage of the heavy discounting 
of the future, and of differences in discount rates. For those who are confident that 
particular reforms would lead to — say — a better, more efficient and more 
equalitarian society, a delay of ten years in implementation would have little impact 
on the present discounted value of benefits. (There is no reason to discount the 
benefits that will accrue at a high rate, for example, because of risk.13) On the other 
hand, critics of the reform may have a much higher discount rate, and ascribe little 
cost (in terms of present discounted values) to something that would not be 
implemented for a decade. 
The deepest problems, however, are posed by differences in values and 
perceptions of the world (including perceptions about how the economy functions). 
Those who adhere to enlightenment beliefs would hope that reasoned discussion — 
combined with scientific research — would help to narrow the magnitude of the 
differences in beliefs.  
Advances in behavioral economics and the research mentioned earlier have 
undermined confidence in this process. Those who wanted to believe that austerity 
works, and that excessive debts had adverse effects on growth, published papers 
showing that this was the case.14 They even wrote about “expansionary 
contractions.”15 These arguments were taken up and used by politicians who were 
11 Some of these ideas are further explored by Anton Korinek and Joseph E. Stiglitz (2008). 
12 This is an application of a general principle. When there are differences in (probabilistic) 
judgments, there are always “deals” (bets) than can make both parties better off, giving rise to what I call 
“pseudo-wealth” (see Guzman and Stiglitz 2016). 
13 In any case, it is generally wrong to deal with problems of risk by changing intertemporal 
valuations. 
14 See Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2010). 


































Joseph E. Stiglitz 
looking for evidence to support their positions. As a result, normal standards of proof 
and argumentation were suspended.16 
Even more disturbing is that large segments of the population in the US today 
have questioned the Enlightenment and the scientific process, at least when it proves 
convenient (e.g., in challenging climate change). Still, I remain confident that, in the 
long run, the Enlightenment values and the scientific process will win. Research, 
tainted as it may be by priors, will help us understand the relative merits of alternative 
policies. It has now become clear that trickle-down and supply-side economics do not 
work, although it has taken far longer to realize that than it should have. And even 
after it has become clear that these ideas are not working, there remains a debate 
about what features of the policies associated with them were responsible for failures 
and what the appropriate alternative policies are. 
Neither markets nor the democratic process exhibit the kind of rationality that 
some economists have traditionally hypothesized. Accordingly, we cannot and should 
not expect them to respond perfectly rationally to theory and evidence, for example, 
about which policies might be good for the typical citizen. This fact simply increases 
the burden on those who believe in theory-and-evidence-based policies: namely, to 
engage in serious research; to attempt to explain the results and the underlying ideas 
in ways that can be understood by and motivate others; and not to leave the political 
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